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NOTE AND COMMENT
FRS£DOM oF Piu;:ss AND Uss oF THS MAILS.-Strangely enough, the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, although it giiarantees against federai attack highly important and fundamen,tal rights, has received very little
authoritative interpretation by our courts. It remained for the Gr&t War
and conditions following in its train to bring before that tribunal almost the
first really important controversies relating to freedom of press and of..speech.
The case of U.S. ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company,
Plaintiff in Error, v. Postmaster-General Albert S. Burleson, decided
' March 7, 1921, is the- latest of a s~ries of notable cases concerning this important matter.. The case, however, adds little to the development of the
subject by the court in the preceding cases in this group, which have been
reviewed in an article by Professor Goodrich, 19 MICHIGAN LAW RsVISW,
pages 487-501.
In the group of recent cases referred to, a divergence .o(opinion among
the judges themse!ves had appeared. In Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 39
Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, in the unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes,
the ti:st of liability for speech was expressed as follows:
·
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"The question in ev~ry case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the suostantive evils that Congress had a. right
to prevent."
This would seem to be ;i definite rejection of "the tendency" or "indirect causation" tests and the court adhered to this view in two cases decided shortly thereafter. Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204, 39 Sup. St. Rep: 249;
and Debs v. fl. S., 24g U.S. 2n, 39 SuP.. Ct Rep. 252. The Debs case, particularly, has been criticized on the ground that it did not apply the' test as stated
above to the facts in the case. (See references in Professor Goodrich's article
above referred to, 19 MICH. L. Rtv. 487, 492. See also the book of Professor Z.
Chafee, Jr., "FRE!m<>M : OF SPE£CH," 90-93.) Other cases. in which the court
appeared to adhere to its statement of the test in the Schenck case are referred to, 18 MrcH. L. Rev. 490, n. 12. But on March 8, 1920, the court announced the decision in Pierce v. U. S., 252 U. S. 239, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 205,
in which as pointed out by Professor Goodrich in the article before referred
to, Justice Pitney, writing the opinion for the court, declares the doctrines
!mown as "indirect causation" and "constructive intent" as the basis of liability. It will be seeri from this brief review of the cases that the court is
divided in opinion and that it cannot be said with confidence that any test
of liability has been definitely and permanently adopted by the court.
In the case decided March 7th, 1921, freedom of the press is discussed
especially by Justice Brandeis, in a vigorous and able dissenting opinion, but
the case has brought the court no nearer to a final position as to what is the
"freedom of press" guaranteed by the First Amendment. A majority of the
court sustain the Postmaster-General in revoking the second-class mail privilege which had been granted to the publisher of the Milwaukee Leader, some
years before. That revocation was put upon the ground that as shown by the
utteranc;es of the paper during the six months after the United States had
entered the war, the journal was !}editious, violative of Section I of Title XII
of the Act of June 15, 1917, known as "The Sedition Act"; that it had ceased
to be "mailable matt~r'' under the Congressional law. providing for the classification of mails; and that the Postmaster-General's decision as t~ these points
was conclu~ive, unless a wanton or very clear case of abuse of authority by
him were shown.
The alleged objectionable matter printed in the newspaper published by
the relater in this case is characterized by Mr. Justice Clark as "not designed
to secure amendment or repeaf of the laws denounced in them as arbitrary
and oppressive, but to create hostility to, and to encourage violation of,
them. * * * Without further discussion of the articles, we can not doubt
that they conveyed to readers of them, false reports and false statements with
intent to promote the success of the enemies of the United States, and that
they constituted a wiiJful attempt to cause disloyalty a~d refusal of duty in
the military and naval forces and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment
service of the United States, in violation of the Espionage Law, and that
therefore . their publication brought the paper containing them within the
express terms of Title XII of that law, declaring that such a publication shall
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be 'non-mailable' and 'shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from
any postoffice or by any letter carrier.'"
The excerpts from the paper quoted by Mr. Justice Clarke seem to bear
out all that he sa~ of them and it can scarcely be doubted that they were
seditious and that they did tend to obstruct the government in -the prosecution of the war. The question remains; however, whether the PostmasterGencral had authority to deal with "the matter as he did. In. his dissent, Mr.
Justice Brandeis denies that Congress had conferred authority upon the Postmaster-General to revoke or suspend the second-class miil privilege in such
case, and in this respect the dissent seems to be upon solid ground. There
are at least three distinct questions in the case:
First.-Were the expressions in the
court. seditious or otherwise illegal?

Milwauke~

Lr:adcr, referred to by the

Second.-If there were seditious expressions in the paper, could it be
excluded altogether from the mails, in futuro f
Third.-Did the Postmaster-General have authority to revoke the second·
class maiiing privilege because of seditious or illegal utterances?
The majority of the court answer the first and third of these questions
in the affirmative and so decide the case. Mr. Justice Brandeis answers the
second and third in the negative, and discusses but does not finl!-llY answer
the first, obviously because he does nr· think it necessary to a correct Q.ecision.
If we concede that the utterances complain~d of were seditious, it by no
means follows that -the Postmaster-General had the right to take the action
adopted in this case. No statute expressly gives him such authority. Congress has classified the mail into first, second, third and fourth classes, not
with reference to the legal; ethical, or patriotic qualities of written or printed
matter, but with reference to the size, periodicity and other external or mechanical attributes. There would seem· no warrant whatever for the revocation of a granted privilege in-one of these classes, for reasons which had
nothing whatever to do with the classification. True, the permit issued recitt!s
"that the authority herein given is revocable ·upon determination by the department that the publication does not conform to law"; but a revocation
limited only to one class of mail, to be valid ought to be based upon some
violation of law touching the basis of the particular class of mail affected. A
violation of law by a publisher, which goes to the fundamental character qf
the publication, may give ground for pr'osecution or for total exclusion from
the- mails; but to permit the Postmasier-General to have final determination
in such decision and action as was involved in this case would open the door
perhaps to all of the dangers pictured by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his vigorous
opinion.
Upon the larger question as to whether the practical suppression of this
paper involved ari illegal abridgment of freedom ·of the press, it may well be
doubted whether Mr. Justice Brandeis is upon sure ground. What would
be permissible freedom of press and speech in peace time obviously would
not- necessarily be such during the emergency of a world war. Those who
argue· that constitutional guaranties, including the First Amendment, imply

.
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the necessity of an unalterable attitude during all conditions, on the one hand,
or as the only other alternative, the complete abandonment of such constitutional guaranties during time of war, -show little knowledge of our constitutional law and its development during recent years at the hands, among
others, of the two Justices, Brandeis and Holmes, dissenting in this case.
See, for example, the opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, 219 U.S. 104. 31 Sup. Ct. I86, and Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francirco, 216 U. S. 358, especially pages 364-66. See also E. S. Corwin in 30
YALE ·L. JouR. 48; Carroll, "Freedom of Speech and Press in the Federalist
}>eriod," I8 MICH. L. -REY. 6I5; Wigmore, I4 Iu.. L. REv. 539; Goodrich, 19
MICH. L. REv. 487; Cha fee, 32 HARV. L. REY. 932. Upon the fundamental
question here involved, this REVIEW plans to make a more comprehensive
statement, in the near future.
H. M. B.
WoRKHEN's COMPENSATION-COMPULSORY STATUTES AND DuE PROCESS.Modem workmen's compensation acts are of European inception, the first of
them having been enacted in Germany in 1884. This has been amended and
extended from time to time until as late as 19n. The British Compensation
Act was passed by Parliament in 1897. Its scope has been greatly extended
by amendments in 1900 and 1go6, and by supplemental legislation in 1912. At
the present time compensation acts of one sort or another are in force in
practically all the European countries. I BRADBUR¥'s WORKMAN'S CoMPF.NSA'l'ION, (2nd ed.) 7 j BOYD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 8.
The moveme~t for the enactment of -such laws became widespread in the
United States about the beginning of the present century, and bore first. fruit
in the federal act of 1908, the Montana act of I909, and the first New York
act of I9IO. The succeeding ten years have witnessed a very*extensive acceptance of the compensation idea, so that at present there are workmen's compensation acts of various sorts upon the statute _books of more than thirty of
our states. While the American statutes _present many types which differ more or
less from one another yet all fall clearly into one or the other of two general classes: (I) optional statutes, in which the employer docs not come
under the act unless he so elects, but in which he is deprived of certain
common law defenses in failure of such election; and -(2) compulsory statutes.
The great majority of the state statutes are of the optional or elective variety,
and siich laws have universally been upheld in the face of constitutional
objections. L. R. A. I916A, 414 Compulsory statutes, on the other hand,
have been enacted in but five st'ates,-New York (2 statutes), Washington,
California, Montana and Ohio. It.is with this type of law that the present
note has to do. and more particularly with the constitutional objection urged
against such a~ts that .they ~ffect a taking of property without due process
of law.
·
The first of-these statutes to receive judicial review was the· New York
act of I910, (Laws of. 1910, c. 674), which came before the Court of Appeals
in the case of Ives v. South Buffal-0 Ry. Co. (I911), 201 N. Y. 271. The constitutionaiity of th~ act was attacked, under b~th the State and Federal Con-
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stitutions on the ground, i11ter alia, that it constituted a taking of property
without due process of law. In holding the act invalid the court based its
decision squarely upon the broad ground that the imposition upon the employer of.liability without fault was in derogation 'of the due process clause
of the State Constitution, and that the statute was not justifiable as a valid
exercise of the police power because it did not tend to contribute directly to
the promotion of the general welfare. The act in question, which provided
for direct payment by employers to their injured employees o,f the benefits
provided therein, was also subject to the same objection which later proved
the stumbling block of the Montana act, namely, that the employee's common
law remedies against the employer were preserved, thus exposing the employer to a double liability. See Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement
Co., post. But the court in the Iv~s Case made no point of this feature. Nor
was the finding in this case in any sense an adjudication of the validity of
the act under the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, although it
has been sometimes cited in that regard. The court expressly say that Noble
State Ba•1k v. Haskell, 219' U. S. 104; is controlling as to the federal aspect of
the case, and further that a finding of invalidity under the State "'"nstitution
is sufficient for the purposes of the decision.
Four months after the decision in the Ives Case, the Supreme Court of
Washington handed down a decision upholding the compensation act of that
state, (Laws ;,f 19u,. p. 345), in State, ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen
(19n), 65 Wash. 156. Instead of the direct paymen~ plan of the Ne~ York
act this statute provided for compulsory payments into a state insl!rance fund.
The only effect of this difference, as far as the constitutional question was
concerned, was to give rise to an additional objection to the act which could
not be made to the New York law, namely, that the statute takes the property of one employer to pay the obligations of another. The court concedes
at the outset that there is a basis in fact for both this objection and that
other objection which was finally controlling in the Iv.es Case, that the statute
imposed liability without fault. "But/' the court goes on to say, "These contentions do not furnish an absolute test of the validity of the act. * * * The
test of the validity of such a law is not found in the inquiry, Does it do the
objectionable things? but is found rather in the inquiry, Is there no reasonable ground to believe that the public safety, health or general welfare is
promoted thereby?" In holding that public. welfare was promoted, by a re- .
moval of the burden of industrial injuries from the workman and his dependents, thus lessening indigency, and placing it upon the employer and through
·him, by means of adjustment of the prices of his commodity, upon the consuming public, the court takes a stand shaI'ply at variance with that of the
New York Court of Appeals in the Ives Case. It is not Jtecessary to the
validity of a statute under .the police power, say the Washington Court, that
it should be "directly designed to conserve health, safety, comfort, peace and
order," but on the other hand, quoting from Noble State Bank v. Haskell,
supra, "An ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant
taking of private proiierty for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use."
The Montana act, (Laws of 1909, c. &;, p. 81), was held invalid in Cun-

NOTE AND COMMENT

733

11i11gliam v. ·Northwestern Improvement Co. (19u). 44 Mont. 18o, solely on
the ground that it preserved to the employee his common law right of action
against the employer for injuries due to the latter's negligence, and thus exposed the employe~ to a double liability and so deprived him of the equal
protection of the laws. As to the due process aspect of the case, the court is
fully as broad in its views as• the Washington' Court in the Clausen Case,
the opitiion in which is quoted from with approval and at consi!:lerable length.
"Any kasure," 'says the court, "which tends to minimize indigency, of necessity raises the general standard of the people." The court also quotes with
approval the comprehensive definition of police power laid down in the Nob le
Bat1k Case by Justice Holmes in the following words: "It may be said in
a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs.
(Camfield v. United States, 167 U. S. 518.) It may be put forth in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or he1d by the prevailing morality or strong and
preponderant opinion to be greatly and im_mediately necessary to the public
welfare."
·
The next case to arise was State of iVashington v. Mountain Timber Ca.,
decided by the Supreme ·court of Washington in 1913 and reported in 75
Wash. 581. The decision in the state court amounts to nothing more than
a reaffirmance ot the position taken in the Clausen Case. The case was taken
to the Supreme Court of the United States on error, and the decision tpere
will be considered presently.
· In 1,915 the second New York compensation law, (Laws of 1914. c. 41),
came before .the Court of Appeals and was upheltl in Jensen v. Southern
Pacific Co:, 215 N. Y. 514 This.act provided for compulsory contribution to
il state insurance fund except in cases of employers who· should insure with
private indemnity companies or who should be shown to be of sufficient
financial ability to render certain the payment by. them directly to their injured emp,loyees of the benefits conferred ·under the act. The double liability
objection was not present inasmuch as the liability pr~scribed in the act was
made exdusive. Also, it is to be noted that by an amendment to the New
York Constitution in 1913 compulsory compensation acts were expressly authorized, so the due process question under the state constitution was eliminated. In passing upon the federal question the court considered itself bound
by the decis:On in_ the Noble Ba,;k Case. Thus, the Jense~ Case, cannot be
considered as being in conflict with the rves Case; and yet a decided change
of attitude is apparent from an examination of the two opinions. \V.hile not
expresslY. relinquishing the position that a statute must directly tend to promote the public welfare in order to be sustainable as a valid exercise of the
police power, the court affirm that the act under consideration is sufficiently
direct in its.application to such object to render it unobjectionable, which in
effect amounts to the same thing. They say, "A compulsory scheme of insurance to secure injured workmen in hazardous employments and their-dependents from becoming objects of 'charity certainly promotes the "public welfare
as direct!y as does an insurance of bank depositors from loss," (referring to
the Noble Bank Case).
The California: statute, (Stat. of 1913, p. 279), which, like the second New
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York act, was passed pursuant to the autho.rity of a constitutional amendment, was sustained in Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915), 170 Cal.
686. It provided for compulsory direct payment, with an option to insure in
either a state fund or a private indemnity company. The court directs attention to the distinction taken in the Ives Case between the fellow-servant, contributory negligence and assumption of risk rules on one side, and the rule
that fault on the part of the employer must be sho~n, on the other. "Why
this distinction?" asks the court. "Is the latter doctrine ·any more sacred or
inherently necessary than any of the former?'' The court thinks not, and is
clear that there is no fundamental inhibition on the legislature in the one case
any more than in the other.
The first adjudication on any of these statutes in the Supreme Court of
the United States was the decision in New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. White
(1917), 243 U. S. 188, upholding the second New York act. The court concedes that there is a taking, but justifies it as a proper exercise of the police
power of the state. "And for this reason: The subject-matteF * i * is the
matter of compensation for human life or limb l~st or disability incurred in
the course of hazardous employment, and the pul>lic has a direct intere~. :::i
this as affecting the commo~ welfare. * * * When the individual health,
safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the state must suffer. (Holden
v. Hard~·. 16g U. S. 366.) * * * One of the grounds of its [the public's] concern with the continued life and earning power of the individual is its interest
in the prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and cdme." In
holding that the statute is not arbitrary or unreasonable the court follows the
reasoning of the Washington Court in the Clausen Case, naml:ly, that industry
itself is responsible for the injuries to workmen and should therefore stand
the burden imposed by such injuries. "The loss of earning power, * * *
however it may be charged up, is an expense of the operation, as truly as
the cost of repairing broken machinery or any other expe~se that is ordinarily
paid by the employer."
The Washington act was sustained by a divided court in Mountain Timber
Co. v. State of Washington (1917), 243 U. $. 219, the Chief Justice and Justices McKenna, Van Devanter and MC:Reynolds disenting. If this act merely
substituted one form of employer's liability 'for another the points raised
against it would be sufficiently answered by the decision in New York Cent.
Ry. Co. v. White, supra,. but the Washington law goes farther and enforces
contribution from all designated employers regardless of whether injuries
have occurred to their employees or not. This, in its practical operation, may
often require the most careful employers to pay indemnity to the injured
employees of their negligent competitors. The answer which the court makes
!O this objection is· that the nature. of the industries embraced in the act is
such that there =. in the nature of things, be no assurance of immunity
from personal injuries, even in the most carefully managed plants. It therefore follows, in view of the unforeseeability of such accidents arrd the practical inability to insure against them by careful management, that it is neither
arbitrary nor unreasorlable to place the burden of such accidents upon the industries as a whole, compelling each unit to contribufe its ratable share. To
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the p_oint that such an arrangement is not novel in the law, the court cites a
number of examples. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra, (all banks taxed to
make up a fund out of ·which to reimburse depositors of a faiiing bank) ;
Kane v. New Jersc.v, 242 U.S. 100, (automobile license tax to improve roads);
Horn v. People, 4) M.ich. 183, (tax on dogs to create a fund out of which
to pay sheep owners whose sheep are killed by dogs) ; Holst v. Roe, 39 Oh.
St. 340, (same).
The recent case of Thornton v. Duffy, (Sup. Ct., 1920), 41 Sup. St. Rep.
137, brought before the court a question which, in its constitutional aspects, is
110 different from that presented. in th; Mountain Timber Case. The Ohio
\Vorkmen's Compensation Law was involved. This act, as originally passed
( 103 Ohio Laws, 72), provided for compulsory contribution to a state insurance fund except in cases of employers who should be shown to be of sufficient financial ability to make direct payment to injured employees, which
employer-s should, upon deposit of security with the Commission, be allowed
to settle directly. Whether an employer in any given case was of the requisite
financial ability was to be determined as a finding of fact by the Commission.
lly § 22 of the act, the Commission was authorized to "at any time change
or modify its findings of fact * * * if in its judgment such action is necessary
or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all of the provisions
of this act." By an amendment in 1917, (107 Ohio Laws 159), the legislature
withdrew. the privilege of direct payipent. from all employers who should insure themselves in private indemnity companies or otherwise. The Commission accordingly changed certain of its findings of fact, and it was claimed
that such changes, as well as the amendment in pursuance to which they
were made, deprived employers who had made contracts of insurance of
property without due process of law under the 14th amendment. (The state
question is disposed of by a constitutional provision. Art. II, sec. 35.) After
holding that the express reservation in § 22 authorized a withdrawal of the
option of direct settlement, and that no inviolable property rights had been
acquired by reliance upon its extension in the first instance, the court disposes of the case very briefly upon the authority of the Mountain Timber Case.
Statutes of the type of the second New York act would seem to be quite
clearly justifiable under the police power as it has been understood. ·The
object. is obviously of general concern, and it is neither arbitrary nor unreas•mable to require the industries causing the injuries to assume the burden
ther• .>f. It is simply a substitution Clf one form of liability for another,merely a legislative change in the rules of law applicable to industrial accidents,-and no person has a vested interest in any rule of law, entitling him
to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit. Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. u3; Hurtado v. California, no U.S. 516.
It .is not so easy, however, to justify the additional step of forcing an
employer to contribute regardless of the effect of his plant in producing the
injuries compensated, as is done in the \Vashington and Ohio acts. In its
final analysis this is nothing less than taking the property of one employer
to pay the obligations of another, and in its practical effect it must necessarily
operate to force the careful employer to assist in maintaining his negligent
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rival in business. To this objection the court in· the M ountafo Timber Case
answer that such accidentS are inevitable even in the" most carefully managed
plants and that it is therefore reasonable to impose the burden upon the industry as.a whole. With all due respect to the learned justice who delivered
the opinion, the conclusion seems too broad to be sustained by the premise.
Granting such injuries are inevitable, their frequency is certainly much higher
in a negligently managed plant than in one which is carefully managed. The
frequency of accidents can hardly be said to be uncertain in any given plant
as compared with' any other plant. But even if such uncertainty does exist,
the mer.e fact that such a comparison will show a higher frequency of accidents in one plant than in another of approximately. the same size and equipment would seem to make it· unreasonable to require contribution on any such
basis as the payr~ll .of the plant.
'The case of a tax on dogs to create a fund to reimburse sheep owners
for -sheep killed by dogs offers no analogy, for here there is a very real
difficulty, if not an impossibility, in tracing the source of "the damage sustain~d. The. same. may be said of the automobile license case, where it is
appar~tly impossible to determine in wha't proportion various automobile
owners enjoy the highway.
It has been suggested, (65 u. OF PA. L. R.Ev .. 682), that the Noble State
Bank Case is distinguishable by reason of the mutual interdependence of
banks,· by reason of which careless management in any one may ruin any
other. But it is believed that as a matter of practical experience it is generally, .if not ·always, the bank in which negligent or dishonest methl)ds are·
followed that becomes insolvent. This basis of distinction would therefore
seem to be without merit. It is also pointed out in the same source that the
regulation to which banks are subject guarantees a certain minimum of
careful managemeni. in all banks, which is not the case in .industry generally.
This objection can be overcome, and has already been overcome to a large
extent, by legislative regulation of industry, principally by way of requiring
the adoption and use of mechanical safety devices and other cautionary and
preventative measures. Another writer has attempted to distinguish the cases
on the ground that a bank can cause but one loss, it being then insolvent,
while a particular industrial plant may continue to operate and cause successive losses. See 84 CENT. L. JouR. 245. This distinction, if it be one at all.
goes· simply to the matter of degree, and it is impossible to see why st•"h a
difference should make the arrangement arbitrary in one case and not in the
other. It would seem that, although the Noble State Bank Case was a somewhat stronger case, it properly was considered as controlling in the Mountain
Timber Case. What has been said in regard to the latter case is of course
true with regard to Thornton v. Duffjr, supra, which was decided on grounds
of stare decisis.
That the decisions in these cases do effect an extension of the limits of
the police power .and reduce the compass of rights protected by the due
process clause of the constitution can hardly be doubted.. It may be said, and
not without a semblance of reason, that such decisions effect an encroach-
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mcnt, the ultimate result of which may be to render the constitutional guaranties illusory or wholly to abrogate them. It seems a sufficient answer to
say that if and when such a result is accomplished it will be because it is
"the expression of social, economic and political conditions," and that "by
the prevailing morality.-or strong and preponderant opinion" such guaranties
are no longer·necessary. FRSUND, POLICS Pow:ER, § 3; Noble State Bank v.
Haskell, supra. Nor should we deprecate the prospect of such a state of
affairs, for after all "The substance of the law at any given time pretty
nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be
convenient." HoLMES, THE CoMMON LAW, p. 1: And "it is right that it should
be so, for laws are made for man, not man for laws.
L. H. M.

RIGHT TO Sur: IN TORT FOR NEGLIGENT D£LAY OF INSURANCE AGENT IN
FORWARDING APPLICATION TO HoME OFFICE.-In cases where an insurance
agent negligently delays in sending in an application for an insurance policy
to the home office, and the thing sought to be insured is destroyed before the
application is acted upon, it would seem illogical to hold that there is a
liability on the part of the company for such negligence of its agent. It is a
well established rule that an insurance company may reject an application for
insurance without giving any reason for so doing. That being so, it is difficult to see any basis for imposing a tQrt liability on the company for negligent
delay in acting upon such an application. But on such a state of facts it has
been held that the company was liable in a tort action brought by the applicant, based upon the negligence of the agent in failing to forward the application within a reasonable time. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mutual Hail Ins.
Co., 86 Kan. 422. In that case Boyer applied for insurance on a growing
crop of corn, against damages by hail. The agent negligently delayed in sending in·the application, and in the meantime the crop was liestroyed by a hailstorm. In allowing a recovery the court distinctly states that the action is
not in contract, but is based upon the negligence of the company's agent in
not forwarding ·the application until too late to be of any benefit to the
applica~t. This decision was followed in Wilkin v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99
Neb. 828, three justices dissenting, but the same court later reversed itself in
Meyer v. Central State Life Ins. Co., 103 Neb. 64o. By: statute it may be
provided that an application for such insurance shalt be deemed accepted
unless rejected within a specified time. See Wanberg v. Ins. Co., (N. Dak.),
I79 N. W. 666, 19 MicH. L. Rsv. 340.
A further difficulty is presented where the application is for a policy of
life insurance. Where the agent. in such a case, negligently delays in sending in the application, and the applicant dies before his -application has been
acted upon, it would seem that an action of tort, brought by the administrator of his estate, could not under any circumstances be maintained. And
yet, on precisely that state of facts, the Supreme Court of Iowa a11owed a
reC'overy by the administrator. Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n., 16o Ia. 19. In
that case it was held that it is the duty of an insurance company to act
promptly on an application for insurance, and to notify the applicant of its

738

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

action, and that where the company, either directly or through its agents, is
negligent in this respect, it cannot avoid .responsibility by the fact that the
application had not been received and acted upon prior to the applicant's
death. This decision was favorably.. commented on in a note in 27 HARV. L.
REv. 92. See also a note in I 1 MICH. L. REv. 6o6, where the writer, in commenting on the Duffie case, says, "but the novel feature of this case is the
holding that an action ex delicto lies against the insurer. It would be a
strange doctrine if ordinary private parties were held liable for negligence in
failing to accept or reject a proposed offer." And indeed that does present a
logical difficulty which the Iowa court apparently overlooked. An application
for insurance is in reality nothing more than an offer on the part of the
applicant to enter into a contract with the company, and it is difficult to see
why the negligent delay of the company in failing either to accept or reject
it should give rise to a tort liability for such delay. It would seem that the
same difficulty would prevent a recovery in cases like the Boyer case, above
cited, but the question does not appear to have been considered.
But a greater obstacle in the way of a recovery in life insurance cases was
brought out by the court in a recent Illinois decision. Bradley v. Federal Life
Ins. Co., 129 N. E. 171. There the applicant was solicited by an agent of the
defendant company to take out an accident policy. He accordingly filed an
application and paid a sum of money to keep the policy in force for a period
of three months. The agent negligently delayed in forwarding the application, and in the meantime the applicant was accidentally killed. The administrator of his estate brought the action in tort to 'recover the amount of insurance which the decedent had applied for, basing his claim on the negligence
of the agent. It was held that no right of action could accrue or survive to
the administrator. The difficulty which the court deems insurmountable· is
that if any right of action accrued at all, which point the court declines to
decide, it would accrue to the applicant. and such a right of action could not
survive his death. In commenting on D11ffee v. Bankers Life Ass'11., supra,
the court says, "the question of the action accruing or surviving does not
appear to have been raised.'. InQeed if the point had been raised it would
be difficult to justify the decision on any logical basis.
There is no question but that the action, if any does accrue in such a
case, must be in tort, for clearly there is no contractual relationship, either
express or implied, between the parties. The overwhelming weight of authority is that the insurer is not liable ex contractu for such delays. N. W.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 145 Ky. 563; More v. N. Y. Bowery Ins. Co.,
130 N. Y. 537; Brink v. M. & F. M. N. Ins. Ass'ti., 17 S. D. 235. Furthermore it is clear that the action would accrue to the applicant, if to anyone,
ahd under the well established rule that tort actions do not survive, it isindeed difficult to see how the administrator could 10gically be held to have a
cause of action. Even to hold that a cause of action accrues to the applicant
is impossible to justify on any logical basis, and a holding, not only that such
a right of action accrues., but also that it survives the death of the applicant,
is a doctrine not in conformity with reason or sound legal principles.

P. W.G.•

NOTE AND COMMENT
VALIDITY OF
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STATUTE REQUIRING HOTELS, RESTACRANTS, ETC., USING

FoKEIGN Eccs TO P.osT NoTicE OF Ust.-A statute of Washington regulates the
sale, labelling and marking of eggs. After dealing with the branding cf col.cl
storage, preserved, and eggs imported from foreign countries, the statute
provides that all restaurants, hotels, ba,keries, and confectioners using· or
serving foreign eggs must place a sign in some conspicuous place, to read,
"We use foreign eggs." In an action for a permanent injunction to restrain
the enforcement of the provision set 'out above, on: the ground of unconstitutionality, held, the act being within the police pow.er of the state and not regulating foreign commerce, is constitutional. Parrot & Co. v. Benson, {Wash.,
1921), I94 Pac. g86.
The courts will· not declare a statute invalid unless its conflict with the
constitution is plain. Atclzi11son T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 174 U.S.!)();
Ilomc Tel. Co. v. Los A11ge/es, 211 U. S. 265. The statute in the principal case
was sustained on the ground that it was a proper police measure, intended
for the protection of the public from the sale of stale and unwholesome eggs
and was not an unjust discrimination nor an unreasonable restriction. The
police power includes within its scope not only P.Ublic health, morals and safety
but also regulations designed to promote the general welfare, prosperity and
the public convenience. Chicago R. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561; Noble State
Ba11k Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. That trades may be regulated in the exercise
of the police power is well settled. Scl1111idfager y. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578.
Plainly a regulation protecting the public from the sale of unwholesome eggs
is a proper police measure. But to constitute a valid exercise of the police
power the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. There must be a real
and substantial relation between the means used and the purpose to be accomplished. I4awton, v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133· However, if a state of facts
can be reasonably presumed to exist which would justify the act, the court
must presume that it did exist and that the law was passed for that reason.
Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 6o6.
In the principal case there were-facts tending to show that eggs imported
from China were produced and shipped under conditions if not unwholesome,
that at least might justify the consumer in preferring domestic eggs to such
foreign eggs. The sta.ute in question requires identification of imported eggs
and permits such choice. It does not, however, effect its purpose-the protection of the public from the sale of unwholesome eggs. It does uot even tend
to accomplish that end. Imported eggs are not necessarily stale nor unwholesome. Nor are domestic eggs' necessarily fresh and wholesome. While it is
true that a classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
the equal protection clause merely because it is not made. with mathematical
nicety, (LindSC:J.' v. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61), still there must be some
reasonable basis and that is lacking in this case. The basis of the restriction
is the place from which the article comes, not the distance nor the time consumed in shipment. The quality and purity of the eggs is not the real aim
of the law, nor does it accomplish that purpose. The act bas no substantial
relation to the objects for which the police power may be validly exercised
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and moreover it invades the rights of the individual to engage freely in business; for those reasons it is involid. Frost v. Chicago, 178 Ill. 250. The real
}lurpose of the law seems to be to aid the domestic producer of eggs, by
appealing to the prejudices of people against eggs produced in a foreign land.
The state may not under the guise of the police power enact laws which do
not pertain to police pµrposes, but which do impose onerous burdens on business. E~ parte Hayden, 147 Cal 649. Upon these grounds a similar statute
regulating the sale of foreign eggs was held unconstitutional in Matter of
Foley, 172 Cal. 7# In State v. Jacobson, 8o Or. 648, such a statute was held
to be unconstitutional as being in conflict with the commerce clause of the
constitution.
The power to regulate foreign commerce is exclusively in the Congress
of the United States. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259- The statute in
the principal case deals with a recognized commodity of international commerce and plac;:es restrictions upon its saie. It discriminates against goods of
foreign origin by reason of their origin alone. The restrictions placed upon
the sale of foreign eggs must of necessity interfere and obstruct the freedom
of transportation and exchange between this and foreign countries, which
such articles on their merits would otherwise have. Such state interference
with foreign commerce is unjustified. W elto11 v. Misso1iri, 91 U. S. 275. The
decision in the principal case in dealing with this proble~ of interference with
foreign commerce, considered the egg after reaching the hotel or restaurant,
as no longer an· article of foreign commerce. But unless the commerce clause
could prevent such discrimination, the power of Congress to regulate foreign
commerce exclusively would be incapable of enforcement. The power, however, does reach to the interior of every state so far as it is necessary to
prot~t products of other countries from discrimination by reason of their
foreign origin. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 4J4. To enforce this statute
would be in effect t-0 permit the state to discriminate against or prohibit indirectly the importation of foreign eggs. This cannot be allowed. Collins v.
New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30. The powe~ of Congress to regulate commerce
does not effect the surrender of the p"olice power of the state. Where the
purpose is proper and the law does not directly interfere with commerce, the
police power of the state may be exercised. Thus a Massachusetts statute to
prevent the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine colored to imitate butter,
was held a valid exercise of the police power to prevent deception and cheating of the public, although it did interfere indirectly with interstate commerce.
Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461. As shown, there was no valid exercise of the police· power in the form of the statute involved in the principal
case, therefore the interference with foreign commerce there attempted was
unjustified. The W'ashington court has failed utterly to apply properly the
well defined principles controlling the exercise of the police power and the
interference with foreign commerce by the state. The decisions in Matter
of Folty, supm, and State v. Ja,cobson, supra, holding contra to the principal
case, are sound.
J. P. T.

